Dr. Schenk sets out the first principles of MEAG’s risk management operation. The internal data has to be up to date and complete. It has to be stored correctly and securely so that all holdings are known at any time. The details of holdings must be transparent. The methods and processes for handling the data have to be able to transform it into information that is useful and can flow into the decision-making process. To achieve these things MEAG uses a centralized data backbone that includes SimCorp Dimension. These features are the basic building blocks, but it is dealing with the unusual situations that defines the risk culture at MEAG and tests how effective it is.
As Dr. Schenk elaborates, “When special situations emerge, when there is a crisis or new business opportunities – something unusual, you have to have all this data, and the processes and governance rules must be set up perfectly. And you need a risk culture that is able to change to another gear; to move into crisis mode, if you like. Then, when you do, the culture of the firm ensures that everybody really likes to work with each other. Everybody keeps a close eye on the risk system, but the gap between it and the special situation can only be bridged with communication and action, with everybody really doing not only what is in their job description, but whatever is necessary at that moment.” Dr. Schenk adds that, “This is a ‘top-down issue’ because everyone appreciates that understanding, managing and controlling risk is vital to our business and our decision-making process.”
Multi-disciplinary team
It is also key to the process that the risk management function is staffed in a way that matches the demands of the business in all its complexity. For example, Dr. Schenk himself has a background in mathematics and computer science and holds a doctorate in economics. He notes that his colleagues in the Risk Management department are an interdisciplinary team. There are economists, people with technical computer science backgrounds, but also physicists. In addition, the company sponsors them to gain Professional Risk Managers’ International Association (PRMIA) qualifications. Intellectual rigor and professional competence are essential prerequisites.
However, part of MEAG’s success in the financial crisis is owed to the 2000-2003 equity bubble, which sharpened the firm’s resolve to enhance its risk culture. As Dr. Schenk explains, “We looked at everything: at what worked and what didn’t work so well. The problem is always interfaces between different departments; between the asset manager and the investor. And there we learned some lessons. One was that we really intensified communication. We introduced a mandate management concept which ensures that the tactical asset allocation not only fits MEAG’s view of the market, but also the investor’s overall situation. One example of what this concept entails are the regular asset/liability management meetings now held between investors and MEAG. Another is the elaborate risk management process with well-documented tasks and areas of responsibility. Every objective that an investor has is quantified and corresponding risk triggers are defined. When a risk trigger is activated, a predetermined process starts. This process always has to do with distributing and exchanging information, meeting together and deciding. Our processes now encourage people to make decisions.”
Today, for example, risk modelling, stress testing and reviewing and revisiting the stress tests and models on a regular basis are vital processes. And transparency is the sine qua non. It is one of the chief reasons that MEAG avoided the worst of the crisis, as Dr. Schenk points out: “If you have transparency, you can quickly manage an asset’s risk. You can sell it or hedge it faster than your competitors perhaps. Nobody could ever understand what a CDO of CDOs was, because you couldn’t drill into the data that really exposed the risk. If we were to buy these products and somebody asked us, “What is your exposure to US real estate, or to British credit cards?” we couldn’t see the answer. We wouldn’t have the data. So we either wouldn’t permit such instruments at all, or would at least classify them as ‘nonstandard’, which leads to strict limitation in volumes and special pricing and reporting rules.”